Summary

Broadly speaking, the article focuses on the tension between the independence of the Prosecutor’s Office and democratic legitimation. Although the independence of the Prosecutor’s Office has been widely regarded as one of the key principles of the rule of law, the problem is that excessive independence undermines the oversight and accountability of the Prosecutor’s Office and, along with it, essential democratic legitimation. As with so many things in this life, the question ultimately boils down to finding a reasonable balance between the two that is appropriate for a specific time and a specific society. When analysing developments in the Prosecutor’s Office over the past 25 years, it can be safely stated that the Prosecutor’s Office is immune to external and political interference; furthermore, it has demonstrated sufficient courage in investigating suspected crimes involving more complex cases and high-ranking officials. On the other hand, there has been growing criticism regarding whether the internal oversight mechanisms within the Prosecutor’s Office are functioning effectively and whether the Prosecutor’s Office understands the responsibilities that come with the role assigned to it. It is therefore also reasonable to ask whether the balance that has been struck should be reviewed and whether the democratic legitimation of the Prosecutor’s Office should be strengthened through more robust internal oversight mechanisms – though this will inevitably come at the expense of the independence of prosecutors to some extent. At the same time, this would not be anything unheard of. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office is already operating in Estonia today, where prosecutors enjoy considerably less independence than their Estonian counterparts.