Summary

In February of this year, amendments to the Penal Code, Competition Act and Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force, by which Estonia implemented a so-called anti-cartel leniency programme. While this term is not actually used in the law, for people specialising in the field, this is the common name for a system of norms and procedures aimed at increasing the probability of criminal prosecution in cases of anti-competitive agreements, decisions or concerted practices.

The anti-cartel leniency programme can be addressed from a number of angles. One is to analyse legal practice, another is to compare the domestic law of various countries, international and supranational law and instruments, and a third would be to examine the effect of leniency programmes on the economy and society. As the leniency programme was introduced in Estonia only half a year ago, the first and third approaches would be premature. Comparative analyses have already been provided in the explanatory memorandum for the bill that enacted the leniency programme and elsewhere. The angle taken in this article differs from these and is more whimsical. The functioning of competition and the leniency programme are demonstrated in the article through a game and/or game theory.