Summary

The application of standard terms is regulated in depth in chapter 2 of the draft Law of Obligations Act.

The author of the article finds that the regulation of standard terms by the draft Law of Obligations Act is unreasonably one-sided and places the person applying the terms in a difficult situation. The author analyses two different ways of making a compromise to regulate the relations between the person applying terms and the other party.

According to the first option, all persons are governed by uniform regulation under which it is presumed that the standard terms of a contract are unreasonably prejudicial in respect of the other party if the terms are included in the list provided for in subsection 39 (3) of the Law of Obligations Act. However, unlike the present draft Act, this option allows the applier of standard terms to prove the contrary in court.

According to the other option, the Law of Obligations Act prescribes the restrictions provided by Directive 93/13/EEC for the applier of terms, especially for providers of financial services. The current version of the draft Act only includes the exception laid down in sub-clause b of Article 2 of the Directive.