Summary

The article provides a brief overview of the main principles governing the activities of central banks in constitutional legislation. The article outlines the positions presented in a report prepared by the committee for the legal analysis of the Estonian Constitution. By comparing the laws of Member States of the European Union, the author attempts to defy the views on the need to amend the provisions concerning the Bank of Estonia as put forward by the report and voiced in an article by L. Lehis “Eesti panga staatus ja pädevus tulenevalt põhiseaduse §-dest 111 ja 112” (The status and competence of the Bank of Estonia based on §§ 111 and 112 of the Constitution, Juridica 1999, No. 10).
Relying on the practice developed in Member States of the European Union and opposing the above-stated views, the author considers it necessary that the Bank of Estonia retain its status of a legal person although this need not be provided for in the Constitution. By reference to the laws of Member States, the author does not consider it necessary to regulate the term of authority of different bodies of central banks by the Constitution. Thus, the arguments for amendment of the provisions of the Constitution regarding the Bank of Estonia based on analogy with other constitutional institutions are not justified. Further, the author does not regard a lack of separation between the bodies of the Bank of Estonia as a shortcoming since this is not always the rule in Member States of the European Union either. Also, the right of the Bank of Estonia to exercise supervision over commercial banks and to issue normative legislation for implementation is, in the author’s opinion, in conformity with the European practice.
Finally, the author comes to the conclusion that the Constitution and the currently effective Bank of Estonia Act are in agreement with contemporary principles governing central banks and thus do not