Summary

Public attention has been drawn to a number of cases in which the police have arrested demonstrators carrying political signs or handing out pamphlets and charged them with violation of the requirements for organising a public meeting. This article examines how to incorporate the importance of freedom of speech into the regulation of public meetings such that neither freedom of speech nor public order and security are compromised. The author first addresses the definition of public meeting within the meaning of the Public Meetings Act and the development of this concept through administrative and court practice. The author then provides an overview of how public meeting is further defined in theoretical literature and contemplates what other values should shape our understanding of this concept. To this end, the author details the objectives of the Public Meetings Act and points to a need for teleological interpretation. Finally, the author discusses the requirements for defining public meeting that the author feels arise from the constitutional principle of freedom of speech. As a post script, the author explains why interpretation is necessary and detailed regulation is futile, and draws a number of conclusions for the future.